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The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder
Litigation: The Need For A Predictable Standard
INTRODUCTION

The attorney-client privilege' has long been an effective means of
protecting the confidential communications between a client and
his attorney from discovery by adverse parties. However, when the
party asserting the privilege owes a fiduciary duty' to the party
seeking discovery, the latter may defeat the privilege if certain requirements are met. This article focuses on this issue as it arises in
the corporate area. In the corporate context the number of people
involved and the variety of interests competing for recognition make
the interrelationship between the attorney-client privilege and fiduciary duties unusually complex. 3 This article will briefly discuss the
1. Rule 503(b) and (c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence provides a succinct definition of
this privilege and who may assert it:
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client (1)
between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative,
(2) between his lawyer and the lawyer's representative, (3) by him or his representative or his lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative
of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a matter
of common interest therein, (4) between representatives of the client or between the
client and a representative of the client, or (5) among lawyers and their representatives representing the same client.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client, his
guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the
successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other
organization, whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer or the
lawyer's representative at the time of the communication is presumed to have
authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client.
The related "work product" privilege is defined and discussed in notes 10-19 infra and accompanying text. Traditional exceptions to the privilege are examined at notes 20-30 infra and
accompanying text.
2. A fiduciary relationship generally arises in situations where one party holds a position
of superiority and influence over another such that the second party is forced to rely on the
first party's continuing good faith. See Small v. Nelson, 137 Me. 178, 182, 16 A.2d 473, 475
(1940); Schweickhardt v. Chessen, 329 Ill. 637, 649, 161 N.E. 118, 123 (1928); Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporationin Shareholder Litigation, 50 S. CAL. L. REv.
303, 318 (1977).
3. In a corporation, the board of directors, officers and individual shareholders all have
diverse interests. Generally, those who control corporate affairs or formulate policy owe a
fiduciary duty to both the corporate entity and the stockholders. See Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (directors); Woodson v. McAllister, 121 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir. 1941)
(officers). A similar duty is owed to minority shareholders by majority shareholders. See
Mount v. Seagrave Corp., 112 F. Supp. 330, 333 (S.D. Ohio 1953), aff'd 212 F.2d 389 (6th
Cir. 1954).
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historical background of those aspects of the attorney-client privilege relevant in corporate litigation. It then will examine the parameters of the privilege as asserted by corporate fiduciaries in shareholder litigation.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the modern corporate setting, the elements of control and ownership are separate.' Since stock is easily alienable on the exchange
system, the stockholders tend to change frequently.' Thus, despite
their "ownership" position, stockholders almost always take a passive role in the corporation's daily decisions and affairs. Nevertheless a fiduciary duty is owed to them, as "management is not managing for itself."'
Although a corporation is not a natural person, it is entitled to
assert the attorney-client privilege when it is sued either directly or
derivatively by its own shareholders. 7 To invoke the privilege, however, there must be a professional relationship between the corporation and its attorney.' Moreover, the communications must have
been kept confidential by the corporation from their inception; it
would be unnecessary to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining information which previously had been available.'
The fiduciary relationship between stockholders and management imposes an obvious strain on the attorney-client privilege;
since shareholders necessarily rely on management's good faith,
they must have access to management's communications if they are
to question that good faith effectively. To ensure shareholders an
adequate forum for their grievances, the attorney-client privilege
should be applied conservatively and the competing interests of the
parties should be weighed carefully.
4. The officers and managers conduct the day-to-day business affairs and decisions of the
corporation; the stockholders are the actual owners. A. BERLE AND G. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1932).
5. One difficulty stemming from this transience is the allocation of damages after successful shareholder suits. It may be difficult to determine which shareholders are entitled to
damages, as those who are shareholders at the time suit is filed may have sold their stock by
the time the litigation is completed. Thus, a new shareholder at the termination of a lawsuit
could receive damages even though personally incurring no loss from the wrongdoing.
6. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
7. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963).
8. The privilege cannot be invoked by a corporation to avoid disclosure when documents
funnelled into a lawyer's hands were not previously covered by the privilege. Id. at 324.
9. Id.
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The Work Product Doctrine
A related privilege often invoked in shareholder litigation is the
attorney "work product" doctrine.'" Two types of materials are considered work product: (1) the attorney's tangible work; and (2) the
attorney's mental impressions formed as a result of that work."
These materials, when used by counsel in the course of preparation
for litigation, 2 are immune from discovery.' 3
To overcome the work product privilege, the discovering party
must show "good cause," e.g., non-availability of witnesses, 4 the
contesting party's superior opportunity for knowledge" or access to
on-the-spot statements, 6 conflicts of interest or lapse of time. 7 With
10. The work product doctrine was established by the United States Supreme Court in
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, prior to litigation, owners of a tugboat
which sank for unknown reasons had retained a law firm to protect them against potential
lawsuits by the families of 5 drowned crew members. The respondent, a member of the law
firm, had privately interviewed the surviving crew members. The family of one of the drowned
crew members subsequently filed suit against the tugboat owners and requested discovery of
the attorney's memoranda, which included statements made by the survivors. The respondent denied the request on the basis that records of the statements were his work product
materials compiled on behalf of his client for use in litigation. The Supreme Court, agreeing
with the respondent, held that the materials sought were the attorney's work product and
therefore were immune from discovery. The Court noted that the information collected from
the witnesses was not protected by the attorney-client privilege because it was collected in
anticipation of litigation. Id. at 508. In this case, statements of the survivors had been taken
a second time at a public hearing and the hearing transcripts were available to the petitioner.
Nevertheless, the Court characterized the petitioner's demand for the initial statements
taken by the respondent as
an attempt to secure the production of written statements and mental impressions
contained in the files and the mind of the attorney . . . without any showing of
necessity or any indication or claim that denial of such production would unduly
prejudice the preparation of petitioner's case or cause him any injustice.
Id. at 509. This doctrine has now been codified. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(b)(3).
11. A lawyer is entitled to a certain degree of privacy in his or her work; organizing
information, preparing theories and planning strategies must be done "without undue and
needless interference." 329 U.S. at 509.
12. Substantial likelihood of trial is enough to show anticipation of litigation. See Note,
Discovery of Attorney's Work Product, 12 GoNz. L. REv. 284, 287 (1977).
13. This protection, however, is not absolute. For example, the party seeking discovery
must prove that discovery of the evidence is a "necessity" or that undue prejudice, hardship,
or injustice will result if discovery is denied. 329 U.S. at 509. The burden can be satisfied by
demonstrating "substantial need" or "lack of other available sources." Advisory Committee's
Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 500
(1969). In contrast, discovery of non-privileged materials is allowed upon a mere showing of
relevance. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(1).
14. See, e.g., Williams v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 30 F.R.D. 26, 28 (D.C. Mont. 1962).
15. See, e.g., State of California v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 261, 262 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
16. See, e.g., Brown v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 17 F.R.D. 324, 325
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). On-the-spot statements possibly overlap the category of superior knowledge.
See note 14 supra. For example, the government may at times know of the existence and
content of on-the-spot statements because of its superior opportunity for knowledge. See
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. 736, 742 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
17. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968). In Lanham, 3 members
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tangible documentary evidence, 8 a party must show that the documents were "essential" to the preparation of its case.'9 Thus, courts
must balance the attorney's privacy against the opposing party's
"substantial need" and potential hardship. The discretion of
the
courts in defining "good cause" can result in inconsistent application of the work product doctrine. Therefore, attorneys and their
clients often are unable to determine what information will be discoverable by an adverse party.
EXCEPTIONS TO AND WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE

One traditional exception to the attorney-client privilege particularly relevant in shareholder litigation is the joint attorney exception. This arises when one attorney acts for two parties who have a
common interest. In shareholder litigation both shareholders and
management have a common interest in the welfare of the corporation. As a result, the same attorney may be consulted by both management and shareholders prior to litigation. An attorney has an
obvious conflict of interest when he or she advises parties who later
oppose each other in court. The joint attorney situation also occurs
where the two parties are separate corporations with interlocking
directorates, and a director serving both has communications with
a single attorney regarding each of the corporations. The purpose of
the joint attorney exception is to alleviate the problems caused by
conflicts of interest by making available to both sides those communications which relate to the other party. 0
A more complex but equally germane inroad into the attorneyclient privilege is the crime/fraud exception.' Communications
of a family were killed when their automobile collided with one of the defendant's trains.
Following the accident, the railroad's claims agent took statements at the scene from the
train's crew and recorded his mental impressions. In the subsequent wrongful death suit, the
decedents' family requested production of the results of the agent's investigation. The Fifth
Circuit held that the agent's on-the-spot reports were discoverable, but that his mental
impressions were not. Id. at 131.
18. Tangible documentary evidence is defined as "documents and tangible things, prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, by or for a party .
Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947).
19. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill.
1962).
20. Simpson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1974); La Rocca v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 47 F.R.D. 278 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939),
involving a prosecution for using the mails to defraud purchasers of stock in gold mines. The
court held that before the attorney-client privilege could be overcome, the plaintiff must
establish prima facie that a crime or fraud has been committed; "mere assertion" of a crime
or fraud is not sufficient. Once the plaintiff meets this burden, the attorney is released from
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made by a client to an attorney before or during the commission of
a crime or fraud are not privileged, while information concerning
crimes that have already been committed are privileged. When
strictly construed, this exception is too limited in scope to be of
significant value in shareholder litigation. Many corporate acts
which may violate shareholder rights do not constitute a "crime" or
"fraud" within the meaning of the exception."2 Furthermore, although shareholders are afforded liberal opportunities to seek redress for corporate wrongs by virtue of expanded securities laws
which provide remedies for "subtle and complex violations of the
law,"2 3 the prerequisite of showing a crime or fraud before the
attorney-client privilege can be defeated diminishes the liberal benefits of the securities laws. Thus, shareholders are not adequately
assisted in obtaining information essential to their case. Moreover,
when a crime or fraud is alleged, the plaintiff must first make a
prima facie showing that such violations exist. " The burden of proof
is difficult for shareholders to meet, since the quantum of evidence
sufficient to constitute prima facie is unclear.
Several courts, however, have attempted to broaden this exception. Some construe it to include torts in addition to crimes and
fraud" "where there are other substantial abuses of the attorneyhis duty to maintain confidentiality unless the communications occurred after the commission of the crime or fraud. Id. at 40. In Bob, a prima facie case was established against the
defendant through the testimony of a co-conspirator. Since the defendant had consulted with
his attorney during the commission of the crime charged, the communications were not
privileged. Id. The court therefore required the defendant's attorney to testify to conversations and written communications which evidenced the defendant's control of the fraudulent
activities. See also Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1967), in which
the court stated that the attorney-client privilege is "withdrawn upon a prima facie showing
that the lawyer's advice was designed to serve his client in commission of a fraud or crime."
22. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporation in Shareholder
Litigation, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 303, 327 (1977). Fraud also can be a tort. United States v.
Aldridge, 484 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836, 840 (9th Cir.
1972).
23. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporationin ShareholderLitigation, supra
note 22, at 327. Shareholders may sue, for example, under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) and rule lOb-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1977). Those provisions prohibit corporations and their officers and directors from
making any material misstatements. A discussion of the wide range of activities prohibited
by these sections is beyond the scope of this article. For extensive, though slightly dated,
treatment of those issues, see generally 1-6 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION (1961 and Supp.
1969). For a recent Supreme Court discussion of the scope of rule 10b-5, see Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
24. Union Camp v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Bob, 106
F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1939).
25. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 549 (8th Cir. 1972); Int'l Tel. & Tel. v.
United Tel. Co. of Fla., 60 F.R.D. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1973); United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). Contra, Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D.
26, 40 (D. Md. 1974).
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client relationship."2" These courts have inherently recognized that
limiting shareholder protection to situations where the corporation
has committed a crime or fraud is too restrictive. The difference
between crime and action that is 2of' 7 questionable legality is a difference of "degree, not of principle.
Allegations of waiver can also circumvent the attorney-client
privilege and place additional information in the hands of the shareholders. There are a variety of ways to waive the privilege, but only
the client, or one acting on the client's behalf, may do so. 28 In the
corporate sphere, for example, the privilege is waived when documents are filed in a corporation's general files, for such filing destroys their confidentiality. 29 A corporate client also may waive the
privilege by allowing inspection of private files containing communications between the corporation and its counsel .30 From the shareholder's viewpoint, however, waiver alone is usually of limited utility, since it only applies when corporate management has failed to
maintain the confidentiality of its communications. With the aid of
competent counsel, management will rarely allow such information
to become discoverable.
RECENT DECISIONS

Garner v. Wolfinbarger
In Garner v. Wolfinbarger,3 ' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
attempted to clarify the status of the attorney-client privilege in the
corporate setting. Rejecting the traditional theory that the privilege
could be challenged only by means of an exception or claim of
waiver, the Garnercourt added a new form of attack that permitted
shareholders to "show cause" why the privilege should not apply in
32
a particular case.
26. Int'l Tel. & Tel. v. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 60 F.R.D. 177, 184 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
27. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970). The court explained that
past criminal acts are not discoverable by this exception. If a person has already committed
a wrong and is now seeking advice, he is entitled to more confidentiality than one who is
advised beforehand not to act, and then, having acted, seeks to maintain the confidence. Id.
at 1103 n.20.
28. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton Rev. 1961)[hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE]. A corporate attorney usually has implied authority to disclose confidential information or otherwise waive the privilege. O'Neal & Thompson, Vulnerability of ProfessionalClient Privilege in Shareholder Litigation, 31 Bus. LAW. 1775, 1792 (1976).
29. United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
30. Id. at 464. Once litigation is commenced, the privilege is waived if privileged information is voluntarily disclosed pursuant to negotiation; the remaining contents of the opened
file, however, are still privileged. American Optical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426,
431 (D. Mass. 1972).
31. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
32. The terminology used in Garner is similar to that used to explain the "good cause"

19781

Attorney-Client Privilege

In Garner, stockholders of the First American Life Insurance
Company of Alabama (FAL) brought a class action suit directly
against the corporation and derivatively against its officers, alleging
common law fraud and specific statutory violations relative to the
corporation's issuance of stock. 3 The man who served as the corporation's attorney during the period of the challenged stock issuance
later became the corporation's president, and held the latter position at the time the litigation ensued. The plaintiffs asked him
about the challenged transactions, limiting their questions to his
role as an attorney for the corporation. He refused disclosure on the
ground that the attorney-client privilege protected his communications to and from the corporation during the time in question. The
Fifth Circuit held that the privilege was neither totally unavailable,
as the district court had ruled, 4 nor absolutely applicable, as the
corporation contended; 35 rather, the correct rule was between these
two positions. 3 The court recognized Professor Wigmore's contention that the social benefits that result from the unimpeded flow of
information between attorney and client may outweigh the detrimental effect of withholding the substance of that information from
the trier of fact.3 7 Applying that balancing test, the court acknowledged the presumption that the court is entitled to hear all evidence, and, therefore, a privilege that prevents discovery must be
strictly construed .3
The Garner court carefully analyzed the privilege because the
corporate defendants purportedly were acting in the plaintiff shareholders' best interests at all times. Management urged its need for
the protection of the privilege by noting the practical impossibility
of satisfying all of the shareholders of a sizeable corporation. The
obvious irony was that the shareholders representing ninety percent
of the ownership of the corporate stock were the parties seeking the
information. The court believed that management should not be
requirements which can defeat the work product privilege. See text accompanying notes 1419 supra.
33. Those statutes invoked included the following: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-52 (1970); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1977); Alabama Securities Act, ALA. CODE tit. 53, §§ 28-65 (Supp. 1969).
34. The district court held that the corporation could not assert the privilege against its
stockholders. 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
35. 430 F.2d at 1097. Not surprisingly, the American Bar Association appeared as amicus
curiae and supported the corporation's view of absolute privilege. It feared that without the
privilege, counsel might "hedge or soften their opinions." Id. at 1102.
36. Id.
37. WmIMoRE, supra note 28, at § 2285(4).
38. 430 F.2d at 1101.
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entitled to withhold communications. "Management judgment
must stand on its merits, not behind an ironclad veil of secrecy
which under all circumstances preserves it from being questioned by
' 39
those for whom it is, at least in part, exercised.
Thus, the court held that the application of the privilege is not
absolute. 0 It concluded that when a corporation is charged with
acting adversely to shareholder interests, its attorney-client privilege should be subject to the right of the shareholders to show "good
cause" why it should not be available under particular circumstan4
ces. '
The court listed nine factors to be considered in determining
whether or not the shareholders have "good cause" for compelling
disclosure of certain documents, despite assertion of the privilege:
(1) the number of shareholders and the percentage of stock represented by each; (2) the presence or absence of shareholder good
faith; (3) the nature of the shareholders' claim and whether or not
it is obviously colorable; (4) the apparent necessity or desirability
of the shareholders obtaining the information and whether or not
the information is available from other sources; (5) the nature of the
claim, i.e., if wrongful corporate action is alleged, whether the action is criminal, illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful legality; (6)
the relation of the communications to either past or prospective
actions; (7) the relation of the communications to the litigation
itself; (8) the extent to which the communication is identified, contrasted with the extent to which the shareholders are blindly fishing; and (9) the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other information which the corporation would desire to keep confidential for
42
reasons independent of the litigation.
The Garnercourt's use of general, rather than specific, indicia for
measuring good cause probably was necessary to render the criteria
applicable to a variety of unforeseen situations. However, that flexi39. Id. The court stated that the attorney's advice or actions should not be altered by the
existence of either a potential privilege or possible discovery. The court added that if the
privilege were absolute, a corporation could disregard its attorney's advice to abandon a
contemplated course of action which the attorney felt was potentially illegal or fraudulent. If
the corporation then proceeded with its plan, it could not be found guilty of disregarding the
warning because it could invoke the privilege and thereby guarantee secrecy in subsequent
litigation.
40. In fact, the court was more inclined to refuse the corporation any invocation of the
privilege. The court cited Pattie Lea, Inc. v. District Court of City and County of Denver,
161 Colo. 493, 423 P.2d 27 (1967), and held that communications between the corporation
and its accountant were not privileged against the shareholders because the initial employment of the accountants was for the benefit of all the shareholders.
41. 430 F.2d at 1103-04.
42. Id. at 1104.
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bility generates a serious problem: when individual courts are
vested with wide discretion, there is a strong possibility that they
will reach inconsistent conclusions. Attorneys and their clients are
still uncertain as to what information they will have to disclose in
subsequent shareholder litigation. Rather than risk possible disclosure of material they would prefer to keep confidential, they may
choose to be less than candid with each other. To effectuate the
underlying policy of promoting open communication between attorney and client, the availability of the privilege must be assured.
Before that assurance is possible, however, workable standards
must be created to enable courts to apply the privilege in a predictable, uniform fashion.43 Although the Garner court recognized that
this deficiency existed in prior case law, the standards it established
fail to provide an adequate solution to the problem. Specifically, the
court did not clarify the quantum of proof necessary under any of
its factors to destroy the privilege. It did not state the number of
shareholders or the percentage of stock ownership necessary to show
"good cause." In addition, the court made no attempt either to
define "good faith," or to consider the possibility that some of the
shareholders may act in good faith while others may not."
Post-GarnerDevelopments
Despite the vagueness of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Garner, it
did represent an ambitious judicial attempt to alleviate the problems peculiar to the attorney-client privilege in shareholder litigation. Nevertheless, after Garner, courts that have considered these
issues have tended to pay only lip service to the Garner rationale
and have rested their decisions on more traditional attorney-client
grounds where possible. Thus, instead of elaborating upon and perhaps lending strength to the Garner indicia, the courts have been
reluctant to take affirmative steps to clarify the posture of the
attorney-client privilege with regard to shareholder litigation.
Even the Alabama District Court, considering Garner on remand,4 5 declined to elaborate on the nine factors mentioned in the
43. The Supreme Court mentioned this problem in United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596 (1972), an antitrust case. In discussing whether a per se rule applied, Justice
Marshall said that without per se rules""businessmen would be left with little to aid them in
predicting in any particular case what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the
Sherman Act." Id. at 609-10 n.10. Perse rules allow no room for the balancing of interests or
the reasonableness of behavior. If an act, such as price fixing, were shown, the defendant
would automatically be in violation of the Sherman Act.
44. Several issues were not raised in Garner at all; e.g., the significance of shareholder
"good faith" if the corporation is in fact guilty as alleged; the reason why the nature of the
claim is relevant; and what is meant by "apparent" necessity.
45. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 56 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
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Fifth Circuit's opinion. Instead, the court relied on facts adduced
at a hearing held after the appellate opinion was rendered, most of
which evidenced corporate wrongdoing." Only the factor of
"wrongful corporate action" was specifically mentioned in finding
the attorney-client privilege inapplicable.4 7 The court held that the
transactions involved were indicative of corporate wrongdoing;"
however, since this was sufficient to overcome the privilege under
the crime/fraud exception,49 no reference to the appellate court decision was necessary.
In Bailey v. Meister Brau,5s an Illinois district court had an ideal
opportunity to clarify Garner's "good cause" factors. The plaintiff
was a shareholder of Black Company, which had been acquired by
Meister Brau. In an attempt to secure information relating to the
acquisition, Bailey sought information from Cappadocia, a named
defendant who, while an officer of Meister Brau, had become president and chairman of the board of Black shortly before it was purchased by Meister Brau. The communications the plaintiff desired
were conversations Cappadocia had had with Meister Brau's counsel in the month preceding the acquisition. Cappadocia denied the
plaintiff's request, contending that although he was a director and
officer of Black prior to the acquisition, he was also an officer of
Meister Brau, and that his conversations with Meister Brau's attorney therefore were protected by the attorney-client privilege.51
Instead of applying Garner, the court granted the plaintiff a right
to see the communications on the ground that Cappadocia, as an
officer and director of Black, had a fiduciary duty to inform Black's
shareholders of the acquisition plans. 52 The court did use Wigmore's
46. Oral testimony established that various people had been paid sums of money or
granted stock options in order to secure the registration of FAL securities without compliance
with SEC regulations. The plaintiffs also showed that FAL had made a public offering of its
stock, intentionally failing to register it with the SEC. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-aa (1970). Asserting the privilege, the attorney for the corporation avoided answering
whether or not he had known of these events.
47. 56 F.R.D. at 504.
48. Id.
49. The attorney-client communications occurred before and during the commission of
these acts. See notes 21-27 supra and accompanying text.
50. 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
51. Id. at 212.
52. Id. at 214. In such a situation, Cappadocia, as an officer of Black, could avail himself
of the attorney-client privilege only if he were communicating with Black's attorney. Similarly, in his role as a Meister Brau officer, he could hold privileged conversations only with
counsel for Meister Brau. As an officer of Black, however, he could not communicate with
Meister Brau's counsel and then invoke the privilege against Black's shareholders because,
in those roles, the parties would not be in an attorney-client relationship with each other.
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balancing test,53 stating that management's fiduciary duties gave
the plaintiff an interest in the communications sufficient to outweigh the interests served by confidentiality. 4 Thus, the only effect
Bailey had on Garner was to extend "good cause" to situations
involving two different corporations.55
In Valente v. PepsiCo., Inc.,"5 a suit was brought by the minority
shareholders of Wilson Sporting Goods, Inc. seeking damages from
PepsiCo for an allegedly illegal merger with Wilson. The plaintiffs
claimed that PepsiCo had made certain untrue representations to
them in violation of rule 10b-5 57 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,58 and had committed other acts of fraud.
In the time period immediately preceding the merger, PepsiCo
owned a seventy-four percent interest in Wilson which enabled it to
elect several of its own officials, including its general counsel, to sit
on Wilson's board. The court therefore found that PepsiCo, as a
controlling shareholder, owed a fiduciary duty to Wilson's minority
shareholders to "protect the interests of the minority from domination and overreaching by the controlling shareholder." 59
When the plaintiffs requested certain information relating to the
fairness of the merger, PepsiCo invoked the attorney-client privilege
and denied the request. The plaintiffs responded that the Garner
ruling rendered the privilege unavailable to a corporation as against
those to whom it owed a fiduciary duty. 0
53. Plaintiff noted, among other contentions, that the injury to the relationship because
of the disclosure must outweigh the benefit gained before the privilege would apply. Id. at
213.
54. The factors mentioned were that the plaintiff had alleged wrongful corporate action,
and that the disclosures had been clearly identified and were not available elsewhere. 55
F.R.D. at 214.
55. See Note, The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege in the Federal Courts, 22 CATH.
LAW. 138, 166 (1976). This distinction arguably is insignificant because one corporation was
acquiring the other, and because the opinion was based primarily on the fiduciary relationships that existed. Since the privilege and exceptions are based on fiduciary obligations, it
does not matter how many corporations are involved. See also Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1145, 1184-85 (D.S.C. 1975), where the court said that "the fact
that the communications are among formally different corporate entities which are under
common ownership or control leads this court to treat such interrelated corporate communications in the same manner as intra-corporate communications."
56. 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970).
59. 68 F.R.D. at 364. The issues in this case arose specifically from tax problems. PepsiCo
wanted to minimize its tax liability and simultaneously maintain tax benefits already possessed by Wilson. PepsiCo made studies which apparently resulted in a method for PepsiCo
to achieve the tax benefits it desired. It was these studies that the plaintiffs were attempting
to discover.
60. Id. at 366.
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Although the Valente court noted that the existence of the fiduciary duty was not in itself conclusive, it recognized that the existence of the obligation added weight to the plaintiffs' request. As in
Garner and Bailey, the court found the information discoverable
and ordered PepsiCo to make two documents available to the plaintiffs.6 However, it based its decision on the joint attorney exception,
not on the Garner indicia. Moreover, it broadened this traditional
exception by holding that communications between two attorneys
retained by PepsiCo were discoverable. The traditional exception
covered communications between an attorney and a client. PepsiCo,
the client whose interests were being discussed by the attorneys, had
a fiduciary obligation to the minority shareholders of Wilson, and
the court would not allow the attorney for PepsiCo to disregard that
duty.
The court distinguished Garner on the ground that it involved a
minority shareholder seeking information from his own corporation,
whereas the plaintiff in Valente was seeking information from a
separate corporation which was a controlling shareholder in Wilson.
Thus, the court's conclusion was consistent with Garner; however,
it was based on the imposition of a fiduciary duty upon the majority
shareholder.
The court did mention some of the Garner factors, stating that if
the plaintiff shareholders were not acting in good faith, if the majority of the shareholders would be better served by the privilege, or if
there were trade secrets involved,, the privilege might have been
allowed. 2 These elemehts, however, were available to invoke the
privilege before Garner was decided. Although the Valente court
made that brief reference to Garner, it refused to apply Garner
expressly.
A more recent opportunity to clarify Garnerarose in the Northern
District of Texas in the case of Broad v. Rockwell International
Corp. 3 Plaintiffs, debenture holders of the bonds of the defendant
corporation (Rockwell), were seeking disclosure of certain attorneyclient communications. They were unable to establish a prima facie
allegation of fraud regarding a securities transaction. Rockwell as61. Id. at 368. General counsel to PepsiCo sat on Wilson's board. He owed two separate
fiduciary obligations and could not subordinate one to the other. The court said that the fact
that his relationship with Wilson was not one of attorney to client was not important. Although it is true that one's knowledge in one capacity carries over to the other capacity and
cannot be isolated, the court nonetheless extended the traditional joint attorney exception.
Previously both parties were required to have a professional attorney-client relationship with
the same attorney.
62. The court did not elaborate further on these factors.
63. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,894 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
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serted that Garner did not alter the requirement that a party seeking access to privileged documents must make a prima facie showing of fraud before the items can be discovered. In holding the
information discoverable, the court placed great emphasis on the
fiduciary duty Rockwell owed to the plaintiffs. Referring to Wigmore's balancing approach," the court interpreted Garner as establishing that when shareholders are involved, the scales may tip in
favor of their interests, and that the existence of fiduciary duties to
the shareholders alters the traditional justification for the privilege.
Although Garnergranted shareholder plaintiffs additional opportunities to defeat the privilege, the underlying policy of promoting
free communication between attorney and client arguably remained
unchanged." This policy persists even when the privilege is overcome by one of the exceptions. The "good cause" standards of
Garner merely introduced alternative methods of favoring the
shareholders' interest in full disclosure over the competing free communication policy.
The Broad court made greater use of the Garner criteria than
previous cases; it noted that there were a "substantial number" of
debenture holders suing, that the securities law violation was
"obviously colorable," and that the plaintiffs were not "blindly fishing.""6 Nevertheless, this mere recitation of Garner's vague standards without amplification is of little predictive value to parties
who may need to avail themselves of the privilege or courts which
may need to decide privilege issues in the future. In any given case,
some of Garner's indicia no doubt would be applicable, but as yet,
they have not been clarified sufficiently to be amenable to meaningful analysis.
CONCLUSION

The fiduciary relationship between the officers and directors of a
corporation and the shareholders becomes a matter of serious concern to the corporate attorney when the parties become adversaries
in shareholder litigation. The policies favoring the confidentiality of
communications between the attorney and corporate representatives must be balanced against traditional concepts of fiduciary
duty. These competing concerns have made the application of the
64. See note 37 supra and accompanying text for discussion of this approach.
65. Before the privilege can be available, the harm resulting from the disclosure must be
greater than the benefit gained from the correct disposal of the litigation. See WIoMoRE, supra
note 28, at § 2285.
66. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,894 at 91,304.
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attorney-client privilege in shareholder litigation particularly difficult.
The traditional arguments for and against the privilege are available to parties involved in this type of litigation. Directors and
officers may argue that a corporation, like any other client, deserves
the assurance that confidential communications to the corporation's
attorney will not be discoverable; otherwise the corporation's representatives may be unwilling to speak freely, and the attorney may
not be able to obtain the information necessary to represent his
client effectively. Alternatively, shareholders may assert a
"substantial need" for an attorney's work product, may rely on the
joint attorney or crime/fraud exceptions, or may argue waiver to
overcome the attorney-clieht privilege. The decision in Garner v.
Wolfinbarger has given shareholders an additional method for challenging the privilege: they may attempt to show "good cause" why
the privilege should not be upheld. They may rely on any of the nine
factors enumerated in Garner, but the factors are so vague and
overbroad that the likelihood of defeating the privilege is completely
within the trial court's discretion.
The Garnercourt may have hoped to further the policy of disclosure by attempting to afford shareholders a broad opportunity to
defeat an asserted attorney-client privilege. In practice, however,
the Garnerfactors have not had the far-reaching impact that might
have been expected. The few subsequent cases have mentioned
Garner and occasionally have cited one or two of its factors in alleged support of their rulings; nevertheless, each of those courts
actually resolved its privilege issues within the bounds of the traditional exceptions. Disclosure often has been ordered, but courts
have declined to articulate what role, if any, the Garner factors
would play in those determinations.
If Garnerrepresented the start of a trend towards fuller disclosure
in shareholder litigation, the holdings in Bailey, Valente, and Broad
are consistent with that movement. It remains unclear, however,
whether parties seeking disclosure are bound by traditional exceptions to the attorney-client privilege or whether they may rely successfully on the broader Garner"good cause" factors. Further, if the
Garner criteria provide an acceptable justification for defeating the
privilege, it remains uncertain how broadly or narrowly they should
be construed. Given the complexity of modern corporations and
their need for regular and extensive contact with their own counsel,
the confusion over the scope of the attorney-client privilege is of
vital importance. The degree to which confidential communications
later may be discoverable may well affect the degree of openness
between a corporate client and its attorney. Yet, as the law stands
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currently, parties to shareholder litigation are completely unable to
predict with any certainty what a court will evaluate when the
privilege is asserted and challenged. If corporate clients are to receive any viable protection from the attorney-client privilege, the
courts must either clarify Garner so that its standards can be applied uniformly, or overtly abandon it.
SARA REINGOLD LEOPOLD

